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Introduction 
 
Suicide terrorism is distinguished from other terrorist attacks 
by the manner of execution. To be successful, suicide attacks 
require the self-destruction of a politically motivated perpetra-
tor along with the victims. Hence, the role of the suicide 
bomber is crucial in any suicide operation: they are “guided 
bombs with eyes and a brain” knowing where to go and whom 
to attack in order to do the most substantial damage and kill 
their intended targets (Roberts 2006). To an outsider, the 
choice of suicide terrorism might seem an absurd and irrational 
decision. However, many people still aspire to become suicide 
bombers and a growing number of terrorist organizations re-
cruit and invest in suicide bombers by indoctrinating them, 
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training them, and funding their missions. Despite all the new 
technology and innovative weapons systems, suicide terrorism 
still remains a very attractive tactic to terrorist organizations 
worldwide. This is because suicide terrorism is fatally attrac-
tive. In other words, suicide terrorism is a popular choice 
among perpetrators because it is an extremely effective strat-
egy for terrorizing by killing. When the global trends are exam-
ined, one can see that, even though suicide attacks constitute 
a very small percentage of terrorist incidents worldwide, they 
generate larger numbers of fatalities than do non-suicide at-
tacks. As Figure 1 shows, from 1970 to 2015, only 3 percent 
(4,771) of the 156,772 terrorist attacks globally were suicide 
terrorist incidents.  
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Why are some suicide terrorist attacks deadlier than others? Suicide bombers, unlike stationary bombs, are self-guided human weapons; they
can deliver and detonate explosives at a specific time and place with precision. Coding and analyzing new data on over four hundred suicide
terrorist incidents from all around the world between 1998 and 2015, this paper argues that the number of fatalities resulting from suicide
attacks is a function of strategic choices made by the perpetrators, such as where to attack and whom to target. Results of this analysis show
that suicide attacks that seize targets of opportunity are the most lethal. Specifically, suicide attacks that target civilians in enclosed and easily
accessible places, and that are undertaken by multiple perpetrators result in the highest numbers of fatalities. Understanding these strategic
tactical attributes of suicide terrorism is fundamental to devising effective counterterrorism strategies that aim at hardening soft targets and
minimizing the lethal impact of these attacks.  
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However, despite the relatively small proportion of suicide 
terrorist incidents overall, the number of fatalities from suicide 
terrorist incidents is remarkably high compared to non-suicide 
terrorist attacks. Figure 2 shows that suicide terrorism–related 
fatalities make up about 14 percent of total terrorism-related 
deaths across the world from 1970 to 2015. When only the 
most recent period from 2010 to 2015 is considered, the fig-
ure rises to an astonishing 19 percent.  
Despite its simplicity, suicide terrorism generates deadly and 
psychologically devastating consequences not only for the im-
mediate victims, but also for populations at large (Sprinzak 
2000; Ganor 2002). As Bruce Hoffman (2003, para. 1) put it: 
Figure 1: Suicide and non-suicide terrorist incidents, 1970–2015 
 
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2016) 
Figure 2: Fatalities from suicide and non-suicide terrorist incidents, 1970–2015 
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2016) 
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“First you feel nervous about riding the bus. Then you wonder 
about going to a mall. Then you think twice about sitting for 
long at your favorite café. Then nowhere seems safe.” Lethal 
suicide attacks are particularly effective in instilling fear, mak-
ing people wonder if they might be present when the next sui-
cide bomber strikes. While it is extremely difficult to know who 
the next victims will be, it is possible to understand the kinds 
of decisions perpetrators make in order to enhance the lethal-
ity of their attacks. Gaining insights into which suicide attacks 
are most deadly and why is crucial to protecting civilians, and 
ultimately to preventing future attacks.  
While suicide terrorism does tend to kill more people than 
other types of terrorism, not all suicide attacks are equally fa-
tal. There is in fact wide variation in the fatality counts. This 
paper seeks to understand why this is the case: Why are some 
suicide attacks deadlier than others? Using newly coded data, 
this study argues that the lethality of suicide terrorism is a func-
tion of the strategic choices made by the perpetrators concern-
ing how, where, and whom to attack. The tactical advantages 
of suicide terrorism derive from the presence of human bombs 
and the considerable control that perpetrators have over their 
attacks. However, some human bombs are deadlier than oth-
ers precisely because of the strategic choices they make in 
terms of target selection, attack location, weapon choice, and 
involvement of multiple perpetrators. The evidence from this 
study suggests that the lethality of suicide terrorism depends 
strongly on these strategic choices.  
This is not to say that all suicide terrorist attacks are lethality-
driven or that the main goal of all suicide terrorism is to maim 
and kill indiscriminately. In fact, certain suicide attacks are de-
signed to be discriminate, such as when a suicide bomber is 
sent on a mission to deliver and detonate explosives near a 
high-profile target. The assassinations of Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa 
represent two examples of discriminate suicide bombings. 
However, the existence of such cases does not change the im-
portance of understanding lethality in and of itself, or the fact 
that differences in lethal outcomes of suicide terrorist attacks 
remain a function of strategic and tactical decisions.  
Existing studies that examine terrorism as a strategy gener-
ally grapple with the issue of effectiveness. Specifically, they 
seek to understand whether resorting to terrorism helps terror-
ist groups achieve their policy objectives and stated goals 
(Abrahams 2006; Lutz and Lutz 2009; Gould and Klor 2010). 
The problem with measuring effectiveness against the stated 
goals of terrorist organizations is that there are almost always 
many ambiguous and conflicting goals, which change over 
time. Terrorist groups may be driven by economic motives, po-
litical and social issues, or a religious ideology. Their ultimate 
goals may vary from forcing the target government to make 
certain concessions to establishing a homeland, or forcing for-
eign troops out of territory they claim as their own. Some of 
these goals may exist simultaneously. In other words, motiva-
tions can be hard to know and difficult to quantify.  
This is one reason that this study chooses to focus on lethal-
ity as its primary outcome. Lethality is a reliable measure of 
effectiveness: unlike the stated goals of organizations that are 
subject to change, lethality is precise and less subjective. In 
addition, lethal attacks serve important functions as far as per-
petrators are concerned. They signal greater resolve and com-
mitment by imposing significant costs on the other side, they 
attract more media attention and generally lead to severe eco-
nomic consequences (Kydd and Walter 2006; Nacos 2000; 
Krugman 2004; Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch 2007). This is 
why many scholars argue that accomplishments of terrorists 
should be defined in terms of the magnitude of the violence 
they inflict (Mohanty 2006; Sjoberg and Gentry 2009). In other 
words, lethality matters for suicide terrorism. 
Second, previous studies on terrorism examined terrorist at-
tacks in general, which limits their ability to account for the 
variation within the phenomenon (Crenshaw 2007). This study 
will contribute to the existing literature by looking at the rela-
tively less studied form of suicide terrorism. Instead of treating 
suicide terrorism as monolithic, it will look at the variation 
within suicide terrorist attacks in terms of strategy and lethal 
outcomes.  
Third, empirical research on terrorism is still in its infancy, 
mainly because data collection on new terrorist incidents, per-
petrators, and their characteristics is still ongoing. Even though 
researchers work continuously to expand the scope and 
breadth of the existing databases, current versions of these 
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databases may simply lack the attributes of interest for an-
swering certain research questions. In this context, one major 
contribution of this study is the coding of new data concerning 
the tactical attributes of suicide terrorism attacks. By supple-
menting the Global Terrorism Database (2016) with new vari-
ables, this study attempts to build on and enrich a major ex-
isting data source for scholars in the field.   
While many existing studies descriptively acknowledge the 
benefits of using suicide terrorism (in terms of the degree of 
control perpetrators have over the location, timing, and targets 
of the attack), the link between execution of strategy and re-
sulting lethal outcomes is yet to be tested with rigorous empir-
ical research. That is exactly what this study does.   
 
 1. Understanding the Lethality of Suicide Terrorism 
In order for a suicide mission to be successfully executed, a 
determined suicide bomber who is committed to kill and die 
simultaneously is required. Hence, studies that seek to under-
stand the lethality of terrorist attacks in general, and suicide 
attacks in particular, treat terrorist organizations as the unit of 
analysis and look at the motivational and structural factors that 
precipitate recruitment and execution of attacks. As a result, 
some of the most popular explanations for lethal outcomes are 
the catalysts for individual commitment, such as a religious or 
political ideology, debilitating socio-economic conditions, a hi-
erarchical organizational structure that demands uncompro-
mising respect and loyalty to the leader, and ongoing financial 
support. The strength of ideology, be it religious or political, is 
one of the most popular explanations in the literature for the 
willingness of suicide bombers to maim large groups of civil-
ians (Stern 2001; Bukay 2006; Asal and Rethmeyer 2008).  
Along with the rise of Islamic extremism, scholars have at-
tributed the lethal outcomes of suicide attacks to the commit-
ment-driven religious ideology embraced by terrorist organiza-
tions. It has been argued that religious groups would surpass 
their secular counterparts in terms of lethal consequences be-
cause they are less concerned about winning the hearts and 
minds of the larger audience, and more concerned about re-
ceiving afterlife rewards. As Asal and Rethmeyer (2008) argue, 
terrorist organizations whose primary motivation is otherworldly 
are more likely to justify killing larger numbers of people than 
secular organizations, which are much more inhibited in terms 
of their target selection. Hence, a deep commitment to a reli-
gious ideology that the perpetrators believe justifies violence 
for a greater cause, is crucial for the level of bloodshed. 
Other scholars argue that unstable political and economic 
conditions that undermine social harmony and solidarity 
(widespread poverty, economic inequality, high unemploy-
ment, and a pervasive lack of civil rights and freedoms) can be 
used to justify acts of political violence on a massive scale 
(Gurr and Ruttenburg 1967; Gurr 1970; Krueger and Mal-
eckova 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2008). Within this context, 
an absence of social, political, and economic opportunities 
causes resentment among populations at large, mobilizing 
them against perceived injustices. While there is mixed evi-
dence on the link between poverty and participation in terror-
ism, a lack of civil liberties is found to be strongly associated 
with higher participation in terrorism (Krueger and Maleckova 
2003). Overall, terrorist groups that have a broader political 
agenda, seeking national self-determination, political inde-
pendence, and eradication of social and economic injustices 
can more easily justify launching violent attacks for the com-
mon societal good. These groups then also find larger numbers 
of available recruits at their disposal, who are willing to carry 
out suicide attacks on their behalf. Hence, a strong commit-
ment to a political cause or a religious ideology can increase 
the number of available mentally and physically committed re-
cruits, thereby increasing the chances of deadly suicide at-
tacks.  
Besides ideology, the organizational structure of these 
groups may also have an impact on the lethal outcomes of 
terrorist attacks (Kilberg 2012; Asal and Rethmeyer 2008). 
The way in which power is distributed in a given organization 
might create different incentives for commitment especially for 
those at the bottom of the organizational pyramid. Compared 
to factionalized structures with competing leaderships, hierar-
chical organizational structures with a single leader at the top 
not only strengthen solidarity among the members, but also 
increase the willingness of recruits to terrorize. Attachment to 
a strong leader as well as embracement and internalization of 
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organizational values may motivate the members of the organ-
ization to fully commit to their assigned duties, thereby poten-
tially increasing the lethality of their missions.  
While all these studies make valuable contributions to our 
understanding of why suicide attacks are deadlier, none of 
them acknowledge the importance of the choice of tactics in a 
systematic fashion. These tactical choices pertain to the loca-
tion of an attack, specific targets, weapons used, and number 
of perpetrators sent on suicide missions. Differences in these 
choices will ultimately lead to differences in lethal outcomes. 
While the explanations presented above are all valid and im-
portant, so are these basic attributes of control and influence 
on fatalities.  
Almost all articles on suicide terrorism start with a definition 
of the term and then present a list of tactical advantages that 
suicide attacks provide for their perpetrators (Sprinzak 2000; 
Hoffman 2003; Pedahzur 2005; Dolnik 2003). The premise of 
this study is that lethality is a consequence of the strategic 
choices made by the organizations and individual perpetrators 
each time a suicide mission is executed. In her statement de-
nouncing the horrific suicide bombing at the Manchester 
Arena, British Prime Minister Theresa May acknowledged how 
the tactical advantages of suicide terrorism had been utilized 
to cause maximum damage: “We now know that a single ter-
rorist detonated his improvised explosive device near one of 
the exits of the venue, deliberately choosing the time and place 
to cause maximum carnage and to kill and injure indiscrimi-
nately.… The explosion coincided with the conclusion of a pop 
concert which was attended by many young families and 
groups of children” (Maidment 2017, para. 5).  
From a purely tactical perspective then, suicide missions are 
versatile operations that can take different forms according to 
the objective of the mission at hand. If the goal is to kill indis-
criminately, multiple suicide bombers will be sent to hit soft 
targets in enclosed spaces such as busy malls, popular res-
taurants, or concert arenas, which in turn will affect the lethal-
ity of these attacks. If the goal is to kill a specific person, sui-
cide missions can still be adopted but with a less lethal 
impact. Even though such advantages of suicide terrorism are 
heavily referenced in the current literature (Bloom 2005; 
Pedahzur 2005; Hoffman 2006), there has yet to be an em-
pirical test of the validity of this intuitive assumption, which is 
what this study turns to next. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
Suicide attacks are low-cost operations whose execution is 
relatively simple. Most of the bombs used for suicide opera-
tions are homemade devices made of fertilizers that are cheap 
to obtain and easy to assemble. The estimated “cost of a typ-
ical Palestinian suicide operation, for example, is about one 
hundred fifty dollars” (Hoffman 2006, 133). So the cost of a 
suicide attack does not necessarily correlate with its potential 
deadliness. While many terrorist attacks require sophisticated 
weapons, funding, and high levels of expertise and training, a 
typical suicide attack can take place in the absence of these 
factors and may still be able to kill more victims. In fact, ter-
rorist groups often refrain from using sophisticated, high-tech 
weapons because they are much more difficult to assemble 
and use than their low-tech counterparts (Lewis 2012). In-
stead, they imitate the guidance systems of the most ad-
vanced weapons available by using “suicide bombers” who of-
fer “the best of the both worlds” (Lewis 2013). By effectively 
turning their bodies into bombs, suicide terrorists can in fact 
produce precision and sophistication comparable to even the 
most complex technologies. Thus, in many ways suicide terror-
ism contradicts the established superiority of high-tech weap-
ons over low-tech. 
Second, suicide terrorism is the most human-contingent 
form of terrorism, which gives the designated perpetrators the 
leverage to carry out the attack at the most favorable time and 
the busiest location, targeting densely populated locales such 
as shopping malls, cafés, movie theaters, or subways during 
rush hour. Suicide attacks offer more structured and controlled 
ways of killing than remote-controlled bombs. They are also 
very difficult (though not impossible) to thwart once the suicide 
bomber is en route to the target. This is not to suggest that all 
counterterrorism measures will fail in the face of suicide bomb-
ings. There are studies that discuss the effectiveness of differ-
ent counterterrorism measures in thwarting prospective suicide 
attacks such as increasing the severity of punishment, freezing 
the assets of terrorists, or eliminating key members of terrorist 
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organizations (Atran 2003, 2011; Lum et. al. 2006; Zussman 
and Zussman 2006). However, these studies have mixed re-
sults, and the point that suicide terrorism is difficult to stop still 
remains. 
As long as the detonator works properly, at least some dam-
age is achieved. Partial success occurs when a suicide bomber 
detonates a bomb earlier than originally planned but still 
causes civilian deaths and injuries: “Conventional bombers de-
pend on the unwitting cooperation of their targets to carry out 
their missions. The bomb itself is stationary.… The suicide at-
tacker by contrast is a smart bomb with a human guidance 
system. He can vary the timing and vector of his attack to im-
prove his chances of hitting his target and maximizing his in-
tended effects” (McCormick and Fritz 2010, 136). In addition, 
suicide bombers retain ultimate control over the choice of 
weapons, which may impact lethality. Weapons used range 
from package bombs to suicide vests, or explosive-laden vehi-
cles. While some suicide bombers wear suicide belts, others 
carry bags with explosives hidden inside to detonate at the site 
of the attack. Motorized weapons such as car or truck bombs 
are also frequently used in suicide missions. In fact, a consid-
erable number of recently executed suicide attacks involve per-
petrators driving explosive-laden vehicles into areas crowded 
with pedestrians, or detonating car bombs in the middle of 
rush hour traffic or busy streets. Examples include a suicide 
attack targeting the UN offices in Mogadishu in July 2016, or 
the detonation of a suicide car bomb on a crowded square at 
the heart of a Shiite-majority neighborhood in Baghdad in Jan-
uary 2017 (Guled 2016). According to Lutz and Lutz (2013, 
31), motorized weapons such as car bombs benefit the perpe-
trators in one obvious way: “They can easily blend with a large 
number of similar vehicles on a street or in a parking facility.” 
Depending on the choice of the suicide weapon, the resulting 
damage and casualties may vary.  
It is also believed that suicide attacks taking place in con-
fined areas or enclosed spaces increase the lethality of these 
attacks, which again can be controlled by the perpetrators. If 
the suicide bomber detonates the bomb in an open area or an 
outdoor place, the blast is much less effective as the waves of 
the explosion dissipate through space. However, if the attack 
takes place in an indoor location such as inside a bus, an en-
closed terminal, or a coffee-shop, almost everyone in the im-
mediate proximity of the attacker, within 10 to 15 feet of the 
blast, is killed within seconds (Patel et. al. 2012). In addition, 
the victims who survive an indoor explosion are usually se-
verely wounded by glass shards, nails, and shrapnel, or they 
are thrown against hard surfaces such as walls or concrete 
floors.  
Given their simplicity and cost-effectiveness, suicide mis-
sions are well suited for both discriminate and indiscriminate 
killings (Sprinzak 2000; Sandler and Enders 2011; Crenshaw 
2007). Assuming that the attack is successful, the suicide 
bomber does not need a second chance or a complicated res-
cue mission, and can easily be assigned to assassinate well-
protected high-value targets such as political leaders, military 
commanders, and ambassadors. With regard to suicide terror-
ism, offense is superior to defense, because offense only 
needs to be successful once: One contact with the high-value 
target is all it takes for the target and the perpetrator to be 
killed, whereas defense has to be successful against every po-
tential attack.  
Third, the use of multiple suicide bombers also potentially 
increases the lethality of suicide attacks. When suicide attacks 
are carried out by multiple perpetrators in sequence, the sec-
ond bomber usually supplements the mission of the first by 
targeting those who arrive at the scene to help the survivors of 
the first attack. Hence suicide attacks that involve multiple per-
petrators are likely to produce more fatalities than those un-
dertaken by a single perpetrator. Given these expectations, the 
present analysis will test the following hypotheses pertaining 
to the tactical advantages of suicide terrorism that can be 
grouped into four main categories: 
 
2.1. Location-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
Hypothesis 1: Suicide attacks that take place outdoors but 
cause indoor damage will produce higher fatalities than those 
that take place exclusively indoors or exclusively outdoors. 
Hypothesis 2: Suicide attacks that are carried out in easily 
accessible locations will produce higher fatalities than those 
that take place in locations requiring multiple layers of security 
checks. 
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2.2. Target-Specific Attributes and Lethality  
Hypothesis 3: Indiscriminate suicide attacks that target large 
groups of civilians will result in higher fatalities than discrimi-
nate attacks that target military personnel or a specific person 
or entity. 
 
2.3. Perpetrator-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
Hypothesis 4: Suicide attacks that are carried out by multiple 
perpetrators will be deadlier than attacks carried out by a sin-
gle perpetrator. 
Hypothesis 5: As the number of perpetrators involved in a 
suicide attack increases, the lethality of suicide attacks will 
also increase. 
 
2.4. Weapon-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
Hypothesis 6: Suicide attacks that involve the use of motor-
ized weapons such as explosive-laden vehicles, car or truck 
bombs will be deadlier than those that do not. 
 
3. Data and Operationalization of Variables 
To examine whether the specific decisions about how to carry 
out a suicide mission really matter for the lethality of a given 
mission, this study uses newly coded data that supplement the 
University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism database (2016). For 
an incident to be included in the Global Terrorism Data-
base(GTD) of domestic and international terrorist events world-
wide from 1970 through 2015, it should satisfy three criteria: 
“The incident must be intentional, it must entail some level of 
violence or threat of violence and the perpetrators must be 
sub-national actors” (GTD Codebook, 2017, 9–10) For this 
study, a random sample of 447 suicide terrorist incidents from 
1998 through 2015 across all regions of the world was se-
lected from this database, stratified by year and gender of per-
petrator. The reason for limiting the time period to 1998 to 
2015 is because the narrative descriptive summaries of the 
incidents were only available for attacks that occurred after 
1997. This information is crucial for coding the new variables 
that account for the tactical attributes of suicide terrorism, 
which is the main purpose of this study.  
In the attack information section of the GTD, suicide attack 
exists as a binary variable that is coded as 1 for cases where 
there is evidence that the perpetrator(s) did not intend to es-
cape from the attack alive, and 0 for those where such evi-
dence does not exist. The dependent variable of this study is 
the lethality of suicide terrorist attacks, which is the sum of 
persons killed for each attack.  
There are six main independent variables in this study. The 
first variable of interest is enclosure, which captures whether 
the attack took place outdoors, indoors, or outdoors with an 
indoor impact. Because the original dataset does not include 
such a variable, a new categorical variable was coded using 
the narratives of the suicide terrorist attacks provided in the 
original dataset. It was coded 1 for outdoor locations, 2 for 
indoor locations, and 3 for outdoor locations with indoor dam-
age. If a suicide attack took place at an outdoor location such 
as an open air market, or in a park targeting a symbolic mon-
ument or a bridge, the variable received a value of 1. If the 
explosion took place indoors, in an enclosed space such as 
inside a store, coffee shop, or movie theatre, it received a value 
of 2. Besides indoor and outdoor locations, there are also in-
cidents in which a suicide bomber detonates explosives at the 
entrance of a building or drives an explosive-laden truck into 
the walls or gates of a structure causing harm to the external 
surroundings as well as killing people inside. Because a simple 
outdoor-indoor dichotomy would not appropriately capture 
these cases, these are coded separately and assigned a value 
of 3. The only criterion used in this coding was where the nar-
rative said the incident actually took place, not what the in-
tended attack location was, as this was unknown. For instance, 
if the intention was to detonate the explosives inside, but the 
detonation happened outside, the attack was coded as an out-
door attack. The expectation is that terrorist attacks that occur 
in outdoor locations but cause most of their damage inside will 
be the deadliest of all, because physical damage is caused 
both internally and externally. If a suicide attack takes place 
right outside the entrance of a building, the exterior of the tar-
get building is damaged, windows are shattered, roofs may 
collapse, and victims are found inside and outside. Where the 
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narratives were unclear, online sources with images of the at-
tack location were used to determine how a specific incident 
should be coded.  
The second variable that measures a location-specific attrib-
ute is the accessibility of an attack location. This was coded 
as low, medium, or high, accounting for the ease or difficulty 
of entering a specific location. Locations that are easily acces-
sible were coded 3. These are places where people have unre-
stricted access, such as public parks, buses, and open-air 
markets. Locations that are not easy for unauthorized visitors 
to enter were coded as low accessibility locations and given a 
value of 1; examples include highly secured business centers, 
military bases, and government buildings. Medium accessibil-
ity locations, which were coded 2, are areas most people can 
enter freely but have to go through revolving doors, or pass 
security checks, such as shopping malls, or checkpoints.  
To look at the effect of target-distinction on lethality, a tar-
gets variable was coded, which also received one of three val-
ues. If a suicide attack specifically targeted a high-profile indi-
vidual with a name and a title, such as a government minister, 
a general, or a senior executive, this variable was coded 1.  If 
an attack was launched against a military target such as a mil-
itary convoy or personnel, it was coded 2. Finally, for suicide 
terrorist attacks that indiscriminately targeted civilians such as 
people in a shopping mall or a supermarket, or children riding 
the school bus, the variable was coded as 3. As the target dis-
tinction moves from discriminate VIP killings to civilian attacks, 
the fatalities are expected to rise.  
Two different variables account for the perpetrators: multiple 
perpetrators and the number of perpetrators. The first of these, 
multiple perpetrators, is a dichotomous variable that measures 
whether a single perpetrator (0) was involved in a given attack, 
or there were multiple perpetrators (1). Attacks that involve 
multiple perpetrators are expected to be deadlier than those 
perpetrated by a single suicide bomber. The number of perpe-
trators is a discrete variable that corresponds to the actual 
number of perpetrators involved in a suicide attack. The range 
of this variable goes from a single perpetrator to nine perpe-
trators per attack. As the number of perpetrators increases, the 
resulting fatalities would likely increase.   
The last independent variable of interest is motorized 
weapon, which was coded as a binary variable capturing the 
difference between motorized and non-motorized weapons. If 
a suicide attack used motorized weapons such as vehicles 
packed with explosives such as car bombs or truck bombs, this 
variable was coded 1; otherwise, it was coded 0.   
This study also includes a number of control variables. De-
mocracy was included as a control variable. The Freedom 
House Index was used to account for the regime type across 
countries listed in the Global Terrorism Database (2016). Free-
dom House ranks countries as “free,” “partly free,” or “not free” 
on a scale from 1 to 7 corresponding to how they perform in 
terms of political rights and freedoms, where 1 indicates the 
most freedom, and 7 the least freedom. In the Freedom House 
Index, countries whose average rating in political rights and 
civil liberties falls somewhere between 1 to 2.5 are designated 
as “free,” between 3 and 5 as “partly free,” and between 5.5 
and 7 as “not free” (Freedom House; Freedom in the World 
Country Scores 2017). Based on these three categories, the 
democracy variable received a value of 1 when the Freedom 
House Index designated a country’s status as “not free,” a 
value of 2 when the status was “partly free,” and a value of 3 
when the status was “free.” From the World Bank Data, the 
gross national income per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (log-transformed) was included as a control variable to 
account for economic development. Finally, year and country 
fixed effects were also included in the analysis as controls.  
All the new variables coded for this study were coded multi-
ple times by the author for quality control. Each coding gener-
ated similar values for the attributes under consideration, and 
deviations were minimized across the multiple coding efforts. 
Where the narrative descriptions of the suicide incidents were 
too brief, or not clear enough to code the tactical attributes of 
interest, additional information was collected from other 
sources including online accounts, magazine articles, and 
newspaper reports. Descriptive statistics for all variables in the 
analysis are presented in Table 1. 
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4. Method and Results 
The unit of analysis in this study is the incident of suicide 
terrorism. As the dependent variable is the count of the number 
of people killed in each suicide attack across all regions of the 
world from 1998 to 2015, a Poisson regression is applied for 
the analysis. There are six main hypotheses concerning the 
location, target, perpetrator(s), and weapon-specific tactical 
attributes.  
Corresponding to each of these attribute categories, a differ-
ent model is applied. Hence, the first model only regresses le-
thality on location-specific variables with controls, the second 
model on target-specific variables with controls to demonstrate 
the effect of a range of targets on lethality, the third model 
looks at the independent effect of type and number of perpe-
trators on lethality, and the fourth model regresses lethality on 
the weapon-specific attributes with control variables. The fifth 
model is the full model that includes all variables. Table 2 re-
ports the results from these five Poisson regression models. 
While the coefficients from Poisson models are informative, 
they can be difficult to interpret. Therefore, the marginal effects 
were estimated for each variable to allow for a clearer interpre-
tation of the results. Specifically, predictive margins were used 
to compute the expected count of fatalities corresponding to 
specified values of the key attributes of the suicide attacks, 
holding all other variables in the models at the average values. 
For instance, what is the expected lethality of an otherwise typ-
ical suicide attack if the ease of access for the location was 
high (3), medium (2), or low (1), or if that attack was carried 
out against civilian targets (3), military targets, (2) or VIP tar-
gets (1)? Table 3 reports these marginal effects. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for suicide attacks from 1998 to 2015 
Variables 
Number of 
observations 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
DV: Lethality 443 11.58 15.19 1 121 
Location-specific       
Enclosure 447 2.02 .885 1 3 
Accessibility  445 2.29 .750 1 3 
Target-specific      
Targets 445 2.50 .663 1 3 
Perpetrator-specific       
Multiple perpetrators 447 .230 .421 0 1 
Number of perpetrators  434 1.35 .944 1 9 
Weapon-specific       
Motorized weapon 447 .328 .470 0 1 
Controls      
Democracy  447 1.46 .612 1 3 
Logged GNIa  447 6.49 1.708 0 7. 98 
a Gross National Income (log-transformed) 
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Table 2: Effects of tactical attributes of suicide terrorism on lethality 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5) 
 Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities Fatalities 
Location-specific      
   
Enclosure     0.268***        0.214*** 
 (0.018)    (0.019) 
      
Accessibility   0.131***        0.100*** 
 (0.021)    (0.024) 
      
Target-specific      
      
Targets      0.402***       0.271*** 
  (0.026)   (0.030) 
      
Perpetrator-Specific      
      
Multiple perpetrators      0.440***     0.406*** 
   (0.050)  (0.051) 
      
Number of perpetrators      0.0947**     0.105*** 
         (0.020)  (0.021) 
      
Weapon-specific   
      
Motorized weapon      0.0189  -0.0745 
    (0.036) (0.039) 
      
Control variables      
      
Democracy     0.00443   0.0242   0.0771   0.0842   0.0112 
 (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.070) 
      
Logged GNIa      -0.0477***      -0.0588***      -0.0607***      -0.0621***      -0.0487*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
      
Constant     1.647***     1.717***     2.149***     2.577***     0.820*** 
 (0.167) (0.164) (0.168) (0.157) (0.191) 
N 441 441 431 443 429 
AIC 5689.3 5725.0 5528.5 5992.4 5132.9
 
Standard errors in parentheses. Year and country fixed effects are included in all models. 
a Gross national income (log-transformed)         
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.               
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The first three columns of Table 3 report the expected fatali-
ties based on the first four models. The predictive margins for 
the enclosure and accessibility variables were generated 
based on Model 1, those for the target variable based on 
Model 2, those of the perpetrator-related variables based on 
Model 3, and the predictive margins for motorized weapon 
based on Model 4. The predictive margins of the second three 
columns in table 3 are based on the full model. While enclo-
sure, accessibility, and target variables received values from 1 
to 3 corresponding to low, medium, and high accessibility, or 
VIP, military, and civilian targets, the binary variables such as 
multiple perpetrators and motorized weapon received values 
of either 1 or 0 (thus, medium values are not applicable here). 
The number of perpetrators was a discrete variable whose val-
ues ranged from one to nine perpetrators per attack, and only 
the predictive margins at the lowest and highest levels are in-
cluded in the table. Overall, results suggest that the location-
specific attributes, the choice of targets, and the use of multi-
ple perpetrators are the most important factors explaining var-
iation in the lethality of suicide attacks.  
 
4.1. Location-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
Hypothesis 1 was that the level of enclosure will affect the 
expected fatalities, which is supported by the analysis. Table 3 
shows that when enclosure is at its lowest value, meaning 
when suicide attacks occur in outdoor places or open areas, 
the average attack kills 8.5 people. In closed spaces, or at 
medium levels of enclosure, the expected fatalities rise to 11.1 
people for an otherwise average suicide attack. Finally, suicide 
attacks that take place at the main entrances of the buildings 
leading to both indoor and outdoor damage increase the ex-
pected fatalities up to 14.5 people on average. In line with 
Hypothesis 2, the accessibility of a given location is also a sig-
nificant predictor of the lethality of suicide attacks, as shown 
Table 3: Expected fatalities associated with low, medium and high values of key attack attributes 
  
Model 1, 2, 
3 and 4 
  Full Model  
Variable Low (1) Medium (2) High (3) Low (1) Medium (2) High (3) 
Enclosure 
8.5 
(8.1, 8.9) 
11.1 
(10.8, 11.4) 
14.5 
(14.02, 
15.1) 
8.7 
(8.2, 9.2) 
10.8 
(10.4, 11.1) 
13.3 
(12.8, 13.9) 
Accessibility 
9.7 
(9.1, 10.3) 
11.1 
(10.7, 11.4) 
12.6 
(12.2, 13.1) 
9.8 
(9.2, 10.56) 
10.9 
(10.57, 
11.2) 
12.1 
(11.5, 12.5) 
Targets 
6.2 
(5.6, 6.7) 
9.2 
(8.8, 9.6) 
13.8 
(13.3, 14.3) 
7.3 
(6.6, 8.08) 
9.6 
(9.2, 10.09) 
12.6 
(12.2, 13.1) 
Multiple perpe-
trators 
10.1 
(9.6, 10.4) 
N/A 
15.6 
(14.3, 16.8) 
10.1 
(9.7, 10.5) 
N/A 
15.2 
(14.03, 
16.4) 
Number of per-
petrators 
10.7 
(10.3, 
11.09) 
N/A 
22.8 
(16.1, 29.6) 
10.7 
(10.3, 
11.07) 
N/A 
24.8 
(17.2, 32.4) 
Motorized 
weapon 
11.5 
(11.08, 
11.9) 
N/A 
11.7 
(11.1, 12.3) 
11.5 
(11.1, 
12.03) 
N/A 
10.7 
(10.1, 11.3) 
 
95-percent CIs are reported in parentheses below each estimate 
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in Table 3. According to Model 1, suicide attacks that take 
place in easily accessible locations such as parks, cafes, and 
restaurants, are likely to generate more fatalities (12.6) than 
attacks that take place in medium (11.1) and low accessibility 
locations (9.7) such as checkpoints, military bases, or parlia-
ment buildings. In short, both location-specific indicators are 
strong predictors of lethality of suicide terrorist attacks, and 
these findings are confirmed in the full model. 
 
4.2. Target-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
Hypothesis 3 proposed that suicide attacks that indiscrimi-
nately target civilians would be deadlier than attacks that are 
more discriminate, aiming at military or VIP targets. Model 2 
tests the significance of different target choices on lethal out-
comes, according to which, target distinction has a statistically 
significant effect on lethality of suicide attacks. Results from 
the full model confirm this finding. As anticipated, as targets 
get more specific, lethality diminishes, controlling for other im-
portant correlates of lethality. Table 3 shows that when suicide 
attacks are directed at VIP targets, 6.2 people are killed on 
average; when targets are military, the expected fatalities rise 
to 9.2; finally, when civilians are targeted, the highest fatalities 
are observed at 13.8. 
 
4.3. Perpetrator-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
Model 3 assesses perpetrator-specific attributes: the in-
volvement of multiple perpetrators in a suicide attack, and the 
number of perpetrators. Results suggest that a typical suicide 
attack carried out by a single perpetrator kills an expected 
number of 10.1 people, whereas a suicide attack that is un-
dertaken by two or more perpetrators kills an expected number 
of 15.6 people, controlling for all other variables in the model. 
The use of multiple perpetrators is also statistically significant 
in the full model, which supports Hypothesis 4. In addition, the 
number of perpetrators is also statistically meaningful and 
positively correlated with the predicted numbers of fatalities. 
As Table 3 shows, in a suicide attack carried out by a single 
perpetrator, the predicted number of fatalities is 10.7, whereas 
for incidents that involve nine suicide bombers at a time, this 
number goes up to 22.8. The full model shows consistent re-
sults, supporting Hypothesis 5. 
4.4. Weapon-Specific Attributes and Lethality 
The final hypothesis concerned the relationship between 
choice of weapon and lethality, and is assessed through Model 
4. Unexpectedly, the use of motorized weapons such as explo-
sive-packed vehicles or truck bombs does not generate higher 
fatalities than the use of other weapons. Based on Model 4, 
the difference between motorized and stationary weapons is 
negligible. More importantly, in the full model, the relationship 
between the use of motorized weapons and fatalities is not 
only insignificant but negative. Predicted values for the full 
model in Table 3 show that suicide attacks that involve the use 
of stationary bombs kill 11.5 people on average, whereas this 
number goes down to 10.7 for suicide attacks that involve the 
use of motorized weapons. Hence, suicide attacks that involve 
the use of vehicles are on average less deadly than attacks 
using stationary bombs. This might be because when suicide 
bombers use their bodies to deliver explosives, they have more 
control over the precise timing of the attack, and have more 
options to choose from when it comes to the location of an 
attack as opposed to a suicide bomber in an explosive-packed 
vehicle, who may be more limited in terms of these choices.  
Among the control variables, the gross national income (log-
transformed) shows a statistically significant correlation to le-
thality. Suicide attacks that occur in more prosperous countries 
are less lethal than attacks occurring in developing countries. 
This could be because high-income countries have advanced 
technologies, powerful intelligence, and rich resources to in-
vest in counterterrorism, which seeks to protect soft targets 
and minimize the lethal impact of these attacks. The demo-
cratic nature of a country, however, is not conclusively or con-
sistently linked to the lethality of suicide attacks. The preceding 
analysis confirms that the lethal attacks do not occur at ran-
dom or by chance. The expected lethality of suicide terrorism 
is in fact driven by the use of different attributes of suicide 
terrorism; suicide terrorist attacks that seize upon locations, 
targets and perpetrators of opportunity are in fact much more 
lethal than those that do not. 
 
5. Discussion 
This study placed the different attributes of suicide terrorism 
under a magnifying glass and demonstrated that many of these 
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choices have a significant effect on lethality. Specifically, the 
accessibility of an attack’s location, the level of enclosure, the 
choice of targets, and the use of multiple perpetrators signifi-
cantly influence how many people are likely to be killed in an 
attack. Contradicting the initial expectations, the specific 
choice of weapon does not appear to matter as much. These 
findings are particularly useful for generating new ideas and 
finding alternative solutions in counterterrorism. 
Based on this analysis, the most lethal attacks are coordi-
nated ones that involve multiple perpetrators and that hit eas-
ily accessible locations. Hence, increased security measures 
especially at the time of national holidays, political rallies, or 
popular events may help improve the safety of the soft targets. 
As the popularity of social media has increased, so has its use 
by terrorist groups. There are times that terrorist groups an-
nounce not only their willingness to continue fighting or use 
further violence but also give away pieces of information about 
their adversaries and potential targets. Critically assessing 
their tweets and other social media activity may help security 
specialists and experts assess whether an attack is imminent 
and take the necessary precautions, which may include raising 
the terrorism threat level, working to increase situational 
awareness of individual citizens, or enhancing security 
measures in key areas (Hudson 2012; Cassidy 2015).  
Raising awareness at the societal level through education or 
public debates shapes people’s expectations about the threat 
of suicide terrorism, eases their adjustment to living with terror, 
and may help them actively contribute to counterterrorism ef-
forts. For instance, an Israeli security guard prevented a lethal 
suicide attack by identifying and stopping a suicide terrorist 
entering a café adjacent to the American embassy building in 
Tel Aviv in 2002. As soon as the guard saw the wires hanging 
out of the terrorist’s pocket and shirt, he grabbed the hands of 
the suicide bomber and twisted them. In another case, an Is-
raeli bus driver stopped a suspicious-looking passenger with a 
duffel bag from getting on his bus thereby preventing the im-
minent suicide attack (Falk and Morgenstern 2009). As previ-
ously mentioned, the success of suicide terrorism depends on 
the success of human bombs. And humans make mistakes, or 
plans may go astray because of human error, or external inter-
ruptions. It is during these times that public awareness and 
alertness would be most useful. Ordinary citizens can play an 
important role in the prevention of terrorism by being attentive 
to suspicious packages, activities, and individuals, and report-
ing them in a timely manner.  
In addition, many of the most lethal incidents are coordi-
nated attacks where the second suicide bomber usually enters 
the scene of destruction just minutes after the first bomber has 
blown himself up. Such coordination ensures that the attack 
not only kills the first set of victims but also paramedics and 
other helpers. From the perspective of counterterrorism, it 
would be useful to develop and improve security precautions 
for responders (Smith 2015). Also, given that multiple bomb-
ers are not uncommon and may wreak havoc in two or more 
spots in a given city in sequence, it would be wise to consider 
this possibility when deciding how to allocate government re-
sources efficiently. Sending all or most available rescue teams, 
police, and ambulances to the first location targeted might 
prove very dangerous because it makes other targets vulnera-
ble and completely open to similar destruction.  
While the present results are important and support most of 
the stated hypotheses, one limitation of this study is that a 
comparison between suicide attacks and other types of terror-
ism cannot be made. While noting at the beginning of the pa-
per that suicide attacks are more lethal than non-suicide at-
tacks, these results do not allow us to see whether the strategic 
advantage of suicide terrorism is what makes it deadlier than 
non-suicide terrorism. However, the new data coded here can 
be used as a guideline when coding the strategic attributes of 
non-suicide terrorist attacks. Therefore, it presents an im-
portant starting point for such a comparison to be made in the 
future. 
This study also contributes to the literature by shifting focus 
from motivational and organizational explanations to one cen-
tered on the decisions of the perpetrators in specific attacks. 
These findings formalize and confirm an intuitive point on the 
basis of original quantitative evidence and rigorous analysis. 
The research presented here represents an attempt to provide 
a line of empirical evidence to further clarify the strategic ad-
vantages of suicide terrorism and test them systematically to 
see whether and how they influence the expected number of 
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fatalities. It also accounts for the variation within suicide ter-
rorist incidents in terms of tactical differences and their asso-
ciations with fatal outcomes. It is a fact that some suicide at-
tacks kill more people than others, and this study sheds light 
on how and why this is the case. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Suicide terrorist attacks are more widespread today than in 
the past. Especially in the last few years, there have been hun-
dreds of terrorist attacks, the most prominent and deadly of 
which have been suicide bombings such as the coordinated 
attacks at multiple civilian sites in France, the triple bombing 
in Belgium, and the back to back suicide bombings in Turkey. 
Many of these attacks targeted sites crowded by civilians such 
as movie theaters, popular avenues, music venues, football 
stadiums, and restaurants. In face of the psychological may-
hem, physical devastation, and lethal consequences of these 
attacks, the comparison put forth by Pape and Feldman 
(2010, 5) is more meaningful than ever: “Suicide terrorism is 
the lung cancer of terrorism.” It is the leading cause of death, 
but has the potential to stay under the radar until its most dan-
gerous, terminal final stage. One of the major challenges in this 
regard is that it is very difficult to thwart these attacks on a day 
to day basis. Counterterrorism specialists, scholars, and ex-
perts do not have crystal balls to see which attacks are immi-
nent and who is preparing to carry out a suicide mission. How-
ever, as this study shows, it is possible to understand the 
attributes of suicide terrorism that make some of these attacks 
particularly deadly, which contributes to our ability to devise 
new counterterrorism strategies. 
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